

4. La prise de décision en politique étrangère

Au cours d'une période de temps qui ne dépasse pas deux fois la vie d'un homme, la France fut envahie sept fois et a pratiqué treize régimes, car tout se tient dans les malheurs d'un peuple.

Général DE GAULLE

Problématique de la séance

L'anarchie interétatique résulte de ce que chaque État forme un centre de décision indépendant. Mais, au sein de l'État, qui décide de la politique étrangère ? Comment l'élaboration de la politique étrangère est-elle affectée par les rapports entre les civils et les militaires et, dans une démocratie telle que la France, par les relations entre les pouvoirs constitués et par la logique propre à ce type de régime ? L'idée même d'une unité de décision n'est-elle pas une fiction, qui ne résisterait pas à la décomposition de l'État en bureaucraties rivales ou en intérêts particuliers en concurrence ?

Extraits proposés à la lecture

1. « Cameron forced to rule out British attack on Syria after MPs reject motion », *The Guardian*, 29 août 2013.
2. « The Imperial Presidency Is Alive and Well », *Foreign Affairs*, 21 janvier 2020.
3. Raymond ARON, *Démocratie et totalitarisme*, Paris, Gallimard, 1965, pp. 86-87, 164-165.
4. Samy COHEN, « Le pouvoir politique et l'armée », *Pouvoirs*, n° 125, 2008, pp. 19-28.
5. Andrew MORAVCSIK, « Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics », *International Organization*, 1997, vol. 51, n° 4, pp. 518-519.
6. Graham ALLISON, *Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston, Little Brown, 1971, pp. 4-7.

Extrait n° 1. « Cameron forced to rule out British attack on Syria after MPs reject motion », *The Guardian*, 29 août 2013

[<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/29/cameron-british-attack-syria-mps>].

David Cameron indicated on Thursday evening that Britain would not take part in military action against Syria after the British government lost a crucial vote on an already watered-down amendment that was designed to pave the way to intervention in the war-torn country.

In a devastating blow to his authority, the prime minister lost a government motion by 272 votes to 285 – an opposition majority of 13 – after scores of Tory MPs voted with Labour.

Ministers had thought they were secure after a Labour amendment was defeated, in the first vote of the night, 332 votes to 220, a government majority of 112.

Labour claimed that the government ran into trouble when deputy prime minister Nick Clegg struggled, in the closing minutes of the debate, to answer concerns on all sides of the house that the government motion would have taken Britain closer to joining a US military operation against the Assad regime in Syria after last week's chemical weapons attack.

One MP shouted "resign" as the results were read out by the speaker. David Cameron said the government would respect the decision of parliament which means that Britain will not take part in military strikes against Syria.

Asked by Labour leader Ed Miliband for an assurance that he would not use the royal prerogative to sanction British involvement in the military action, the prime minister told MPs: "I can give that assurance. Let me say, the House has not voted for either motion tonight. I strongly believe in the need for a tough response to the use of chemical weapons, but I also believe in respecting the will of this House of Commons.

"It is very clear tonight that, while the House has not passed a motion, it is clear to me that the British parliament, reflecting the views of the British people, does not want to see British military action.

"I get that and the government will act accordingly."

(...)

Extrait n° 2. « The Imperial Presidency Is Alive and Well », *Foreign Affairs*, 21 janvier 2020.

Less than a week after President Donald Trump ordered the killing of Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution requiring Trump to seek congressional approval for any further military action against Iran. The Senate will likely pass a similar resolution soon, with several Republicans expected to break ranks to vote to check the president's war-making power. And Congress is simultaneously deep in an impeachment process born of the president's dealings with Ukraine.

(...)

But don't be fooled by the sudden congressional focus on foreign policy. Congress remains in a weak position to restrain the president overseas. The Democrats believe that Trump's efforts to withhold aid to Ukraine until its government agreed to investigate former Vice President Joe Biden constituted an abuse of power and necessitated a vote to impeach the president. But the outcome of the Senate trial will reflect domestic politics, not senators' views about legislative oversight of foreign affairs. Congress's inability to pass a veto-proof bill to limit the president's war powers in Iran, moreover, is one more sign that the balance of power on foreign policy isn't shifting back toward the legislative branch.

(...)

In 1973, the historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., published *The Imperial Presidency*, detailing the gradual ascendancy of the president over Congress in the decades after World War II. The Founders assigned Congress numerous foreign policy powers, including the power to declare war and to regulate foreign commerce. But Schlesinger demonstrated that the exigencies of the Cold War, together with the president's constitutional designation as commander in chief and legislators' eagerness to delegate power to the executive on foreign affairs, enabled the president to use force around the globe with few constraints. This trend culminated in the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave President Lyndon Johnson virtually unlimited power to use force in Southeast Asia and resulted in the historic tragedy in Vietnam.

As the Vietnam War wound down, and the presidency of Richard Nixon entered troubled waters at home, Congress sought to reassert its foreign policy prerogatives. In 1973, it passed the War Powers Resolution (WPR), which required the president to notify Congress upon ordering troops into combat and to seek an authorization for use of military force (AUMF) if those troops remained deployed for more than 60 days (with the possibility of a 30-day withdrawal period). Nixon vetoed the resolution, but Congress overrode his veto. A year later, Nixon's presidency ended in disgrace, and in 1975, the Senate moved to further constrain the executive by establishing what would

become known as the Church Committee, after its chairman, Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho, to identify abuses committed by the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency, and Internal Revenue Service. Then in 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which required the executive branch to seek warrants for wiretaps and other surveillance activities from the newly created FISA Court.

(...)

If the Cold War led to the rise of the imperial presidency, the end of the Cold War left the office virtually unconstrained overseas. Without great-power competition to focus the public's attention, Congress turned inward. Constituents no longer seemed to value expertise on foreign affairs, so new members were less likely to develop proficiency. Leading committees such as Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Armed Services held fewer and fewer hearings, thus limiting direct legislative oversight of the executive branch.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks refocused attention on foreign policy, but they only accelerated the trend toward increasing presidential war power. Congress authorized the use of military force against those responsible for the attacks, but the same AUMF has been used to justify nearly two decades of military or related action in at least 14 countries. (Congress passed a separate AUMF in 2002 authorizing the war in Iraq.) Later, the United States engaged in a new military effort in Iraq and Syria to combat the rise of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, but there was little congressional appetite to update either AUMF. As a result, both authorizations remain on the books for the president to invoke. Indeed, National Security Adviser Robert O'Brien asserted that the 2002 AUMF gave Trump the authority to kill Soleimani.

(...)

The last time Congress sought to reclaim power over foreign policy from the executive branch was after Watergate—and those reforms ultimately faltered. This Congress is roiled by intense partisanship and unlikely to have any more success reining in the president. The old adage that “politics stops at the water's edge” hasn't applied to Congress in decades—if it ever did. Party-line reactions to the president's order to kill Soleimani illustrate the dilemma: rather than rally around the president, as members of both parties did initially after 9/11, Democrats, led by Pelosi, reacted critically to Trump's move. In addition to asking why the president didn't abide by the WPR requirement to notify certain lawmakers in both chambers in advance of the strike, Democrats wanted to know why the president's formal notification after the fact was classified, preventing lawmakers from discussing the evidence publicly. Most Republicans, by contrast, quickly lined up to support the administration. Senator Mike Lee, a Republican from Utah, stood out for his criticism of the quality of the administration's briefing on the strike. He also agreed to cosponsor the Senate

resolution requiring the president to seek authorization for any further military action against Iran, but he was careful to emphasize that he was not criticizing Trump.

It is not just partisanship preventing Congress from taking more responsibility for foreign policy. Lawmakers regardless of party status are loath to leave their fingerprints on measures that limit presidential discretion in committing troops abroad, for fear of having those measures held against them down the road. Legislators also benefit from the status quo: they can lodge procedural complaints against presidents who ignore Congress when conducting military action, while still proclaiming support for U.S. troops. There have been exceptions, of course. Democratic Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia, his former Senate colleague Bob Corker, a Republican from Tennessee, and, most recently, the bipartisan group of seven House members have all pushed for a new assertion of congressional war powers. But those are the exceptions that prove the rule. And as long as lawmakers avoid these risks, the president will have a free hand to stretch existing authorities—such as the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs—beyond recognition.

During the Senate impeachment trial, Democrats will remind the American people that Trump sought to hold up congressionally legislated aid to Ukraine for his own political gain, an act that the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office argued broke the Impoundment Control Act, another law enacted in response to Nixon's power grab in the early 1970s. But the same intensely partisan forces that have dominated Trump's presidency will shape lawmakers' views about removing him from office—or even restraining his scope of action. Much as we might wish them to, lawmakers are unlikely to seize this opportunity to reassert the powers entrusted to them by the framers of the Constitution.

Extrait n° 3. Raymond ARON, *Démocratie et totalitarisme*, Paris, Gallimard, 1965, pp. 86-87, 164-165.

Il ne suffit pas de dire que le principe de la démocratie, c'est à la fois le respect des lois et le sens du compromis ; il y a un bon et un mauvais usage du compromis. La tragédie des régimes occidentaux, c'est que, dans certains domaines le compromis cause des catastrophes. Bien souvent, dans la conduite de la politique étrangère, le compromis n'ouvre pas une issue ; il faut choisir entre deux politiques, chacune des deux comporte des avantages et des inconvénients, des risques et des chances. Quant à la politique intermédiaire, elle ne réduit pas les périls, elle les multiplie, parfois elle additionne les inconvénients des deux politiques possibles. Prenons un exemple suffisamment ancien pour qu'il ne soulève pas de passions : lorsque l'Italie de Mussolini a entrepris la conquête de l'Éthiopie, sur le papier deux politiques s'offraient à la France, l'une était de laisser faire Mussolini et l'autre de l'empêcher, fût-ce par l'usage des moyens militaires, avec la conviction que la disproportion des forces entre l'Italie seule d'un côté, la Grande-Bretagne, la France et ses alliés de l'autre, excluait un conflit militaire. La politique choisie fut d'imposer des sanctions, mais des sanctions assez inefficaces pour écarter tout risque de réplique militaire de l'Italie. La conséquence, prévisible, fut que l'Italie se trouva suffisamment irritée par les sanctions pour glisser du côté de l'Axe sans être gênée dans ses entreprises au point d'être contrainte de s'arrêter.

(...)

Ce qui reste vrai, c'est que la politique étrangère des régimes constitutionnels-pluralistes sera toujours menacée d'inefficacité en certaines circonstances, c'est-à-dire lorsqu'elle sera aux prises avec des régimes de nature foncièrement différente. Les parlementaires auront toujours de la peine à comprendre le mécanisme mental d'hommes formés dans un univers autre, habitués à des pratiques autres. Ce danger d'incompréhension est multiplié par la répugnance de ces régimes à accepter les faits quand ils sont déplaisants et à prendre des risques quand il faut agir.

La propension à refuser les faits et l'hésitation à prendre les risques sont, me direz-vous, des caractéristiques de la nature humaine beaucoup plus que d'un type de régime. Jusqu'à un certain point, cette objection est vraie ; les hommes, quels qu'ils soient, préfèrent imaginer le monde conformément à leurs préférences et non pas le voir tel qu'il est lorsqu'il paraît odieux. Il y a aussi une catégorie d'hommes, et pas tous des névrosés, qui ont un penchant inverse, ils voient toujours les catastrophes monter à l'horizon et non les choses tourner à leur avantage. Tout de même, dans la presse, dans la vie politique, il est plus fréquent de voir le monde tel qu'on voudrait qu'il fût plutôt que tel qu'il est.

Les régimes de paroles et de discussion auront toujours peine à faire un choix radical, toujours tendance à préférer le compromis. Or, en politique étrangère, il faut souvent choisir et choisir rapidement. Souvenez-vous de l'occupation de la Rhénanie en mars 1936 ; l'alternative était claire : réplique militaire ou acceptation. Une réplique militaire était difficile à la veille des élections, l'acceptation passive était difficile en raison de la portée de l'événement. On a choisi la formule intermédiaire, c'est-à-dire que l'on a déclaré solennellement que l'on n'accepterait pas ce que l'on acceptait en fait.

L'exemple est caricatural, mais la caricature symbolique. Tout régime de cet ordre sera toujours enclin à substituer le refus verbal au refus effectif et à croire que le monde n'est pas ce qu'il est. Extrait n° 4. Samy COHEN, « Le pouvoir politique et l'armée », *Pouvoirs*, n° 125, 2008, pp. 19-28.

Du pouvoir politique et de l'armée, qui décide ? Le pouvoir politique est-il capable de contrôler l'armée ? Ce type de questions est inhérent à tout régime démocratique qui postule la prééminence du pouvoir civil sur les militaires. Mais comment analyser ces rapports sans verser dans la dénonciation souvent facile et complaisante des dangers du « pouvoir militaire » ? Il est nécessaire de partir de deux préalables méthodologiques. Le premier est de ne pas se limiter au seul point de vue de la sociologie militaire qui privilégie l'observation de l'armée (de ses activités, ses croyances, la manière dont les officiers perçoivent leur rôle dans la société, l'origine sociale des élites militaires, etc.) La manière dont le pouvoir civil conçoit son rôle dans les questions de défense, la marge de manœuvre qu'il accorde aux militaires, les moyens dont il se dote pour contrôler l'armée sont des variables au moins aussi importantes. C'est l'attitude du politique qui est décisive. C'est de lui que dépend l'influence de l'armée. Le second préalable est d'adopter autant que faire se peut une démarche comparative. Les rapports civils-militaires se comprennent mieux, du moins dans le cas de la France, quand on les resitue dans une perspective historique.

Les rapports entre le pouvoir politique et l'armée ont longtemps été régis selon des règles simples, non écrites : l'armée s'abstenait de s'immiscer dans la politique. En échange, le gouvernement ne s'ingérait pas dans la conduite des affaires militaires, sauf par le biais de l'allocation des crédits militaires. Cela était particulièrement vrai sous la III^e République. Ce pacte non écrit accordait en réalité aux militaires une grande influence sur la politique étrangère et militaire. Intimidés par l'uniforme, peu au fait des questions militaires, les dirigeants politiques, à quelques rares exceptions près, s'en remettaient volontiers aux chefs militaires pour toutes les décisions concernant la défense.

(...)

La V^e République opère un tournant majeur dans les relations entre le pouvoir politique et les chefs militaires. L'ordre politique prend le pas sur l'ordre militaire, consacrant ainsi le triomphe des thèses de Clausewitz. Le chef de l'État devient, en vertu de la

Constitution, le « chef des armées », qu'il aurait toujours dû être. Les généraux, à la faveur de l'affaire algérienne, n'avaient pas hésité à empiéter sur la sphère politique. Avec de Gaulle et la V^e République, le pouvoir politique envahit le domaine du commandement militaire. Il assume la responsabilité des grandes orientations sans nécessairement solliciter l'avis des chefs militaires qui deviennent des auxiliaires, certes pas toujours commodes, mais dans l'ensemble soumis à l'autorité politique.

(...)

C'est au cours de ces années (1958-1962) que se dessine le nouveau partage des pouvoirs entre le politique et le militaire, que les nouvelles règles s'établissent. Le nucléaire a contribué à enraciner cette évolution. Il a également permis aux militaires de justifier leur subordination au pouvoir politique, escamotant ainsi de la mémoire collective le non-respect des règles démocratiques manifesté par une partie d'entre eux pendant la crise algérienne.

Mais il faudrait se garder également d'une vision trop idyllique des rapports politiques-militaires. La subordination n'implique pas adhésion sans réserve et n'exclut pas une certaine dose de méfiance. Le politique et le militaire n'ont pas contracté un mariage d'amour mais de raison. La subordination du militaire au politique ne doit pas masquer la méfiance qu'inspire souvent un pouvoir politique dont les décisions en matière de défense sont – selon les militaires – beaucoup trop inspirées par des calculs de politique politicienne.

Une autre difficulté apparaît : l'apprentissage du politique demande du temps. Un président élu – à moins qu'il soit un militaire comme le fut de Gaulle – n'a pas la formation nécessaire pour assumer les responsabilités que lui confère la Constitution. Cela est vrai dans tous les pays. En matière de stratégie nucléaire, il dispose de très peu de connaissances. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing confessait son « ignorance » et « l'état d'inexpérience » dans lequel il se trouvait lors de son accession à la magistrature suprême. Selon le général Lacaze, chef d'état-major des armées de 1981 à 1985, un nouveau président serait dans la position du « conducteur du dimanche » qui se verrait confier une Formule 1. Mais cet état de dilettantisme est temporaire. Tout le système sur lequel repose la dissuasion nucléaire, qui suppose un décideur suprême averti, lui impose un apprentissage accéléré.

(...)

Que le pouvoir politique ne puisse contrôler le moindre rouage du ministère de la Défense est une évidence. Dans quel autre pays y aurait-il ce mythique contrôle absolu du militaire par le pouvoir civil ? Mais ce dernier n'est pas sous la coupe de « ses » militaires, un radeau en perdition à la merci des éléments. L'idée d'un pouvoir politique avalisant sans discussion les propositions des états-majors ne correspond pas à la réalité.

Extrait n° 5. Andrew MORAVCSIK, « Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, *International Organization*, 1997, vol. 51, n° 4, pp. 518-519.

(...)

In the liberal conception of domestic politics, the state is not an actor but a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors. Representative institutions and practices constitute the critical “transmission belt” by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy. Individuals turn to the state to achieve goals that private behavior is unable to achieve efficiently. Government policy is therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences.

This is not to adopt a narrowly pluralist view of domestic politics in which all individuals and groups have equal influence on state policy, nor one in which the structure of state institutions is irrelevant. No government rests on universal or unbiased political representation; every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than others. In an extreme hypothetical case, representation might empower a narrow bureaucratic class or even a single tyrannical individual, such as an ideal-typical Pol Pot or Josef Stalin. Between theoretical extremes of tyranny and democracy, many representative institutions and practices exist, each of which privileges particular demands; hence the nature of state institutions, alongside societal interests themselves, is a key determinant of what states do internationally.

Representation, in the liberal view, is not simply a formal attribute of state institutions but includes other stable characteristics of the political process, formal or informal, that privilege particular societal interests. Clientelistic authoritarian régimes may distinguish those with familial, bureaucratic, or economic ties to the governing elite from those without. Even where government institutions are formally fair and open, a relatively inegalitarian distribution of property, risk, information, or organizational capabilities may create social or economic monopolies able to dominate policy. Similarly, the way in which a state recognizes individual rights may shape opportunities for voice. Certain domestic representational processes may tend to select as leaders individuals, groups, and bureaucracies socialized with particular attitudes toward information, risk, and loss. Finally, cost-effective exit options, such as emigration, noncompliance, or the transfer of assets to new jurisdictions or uses, insofar as they constrain governments, may be thought of as substitutes for formal representation.

Societal pressures transmitted by representative institutions and practices alter “state preferences.” This term designates an ordering among underlying substantive outcomes

that may result from international political interaction. Here it is essential—particularly given the inconsistency of common usage—to avoid conceptual confusion by keeping state “preferences” distinct from national “strategies,” “tactics,” and “policies,” that is, the particular transient bargaining positions, negotiating demands, or policy goals that constitute the everyday currency of foreign policy. State preferences, as the concept is employed here, comprise a set of fundamental interests defined across “states of the world.” Preferences are by definition causally independent of the strategies of other actors and, therefore, prior to specific interstate political interactions, including external threats, incentives, manipulation of information, or other tactics. By contrast, strategies and tactics—sometimes also termed “preferences” in game-theoretical analyses—are policy options defined across intermediate political aims, as when governments declare an “interest” in “maintaining the balance of power,” “containing” or “appeasing” an adversary, or exercising “global leadership.” Liberal theory focuses on the consequences for state behavior of shifts in fundamental preferences, not shifts in the strategic circumstances under which states pursue them.

Representative institutions and practices determine not merely which social coalitions are represented in foreign policy, but how they are represented. Two distinctions are critical. First, states may act in either a unitary or “disaggregated” way. In many traditional areas of foreign policy, “politics stops at the water’s edge,” and there is strong coordination among national officials and politicians. In other areas, the state may be “disaggregated,” with different elements—executives, courts, central banks, regulatory bureaucracies, and ruling parties, for example—conducting semiautonomous foreign policies in the service of disparate societal interests. Second, domestic decision making may be structured so as to generate state preferences that satisfy a strong rationality condition, such as transitivity or strict expected utility maximization, or so as to satisfy only the weaker rationality criterion of seeking efficient means. Recently, formal theorists have derived specific conditions under which nonunitary state behavior can be analyzed “as if” it were unitary and rational, implying that much superficially “nonrational” or “nonunitary” behavior should actually be understood in terms of shifting state preferences.

(...)

Extrait n° 6. Graham ALLISON, *Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston, Little Brown, 1971, pp. 4-7.

(...)

In spite of significant differences in interest and focus, most analysts and ordinary laymen attempt to understand happenings in foreign affairs as the more or less purposive acts of unified national governments. Laymen personify rational actors and speak of their aims and choices. Theorists of international relations focus on problems between nations in accounting for the choices of unitary rational actors. Strategic analysts concentrate on the logic of action in the absence of an actor. For each of these groups, the point of an explanation is to show how the nation or government could have chosen to act as it did, given the strategic problems it faced. For example, in confronting the problem posed by the Soviet installation of strategic missiles in Cuba, the Model I analyst [*l'observateur qui adopte le premier point de vue que vient de décrire l'auteur, par opposition aux deux autres points de vue décrits ci-dessous*] frames the puzzle : Why did the Soviet Union decide to install missiles in Cuba? He then fixes the unit of analysis: governmental choice. Next, he focuses attention on certain concepts : goals and objectives of the nation or government. And finally, he invokes certain patterns of inference: if the nation performed an action of this sort, it must have had a goal of this type. The analyst has “explained” this event when he can show how placing missiles in Cuba was a reasonable action, given Soviet strategic objectives. Predictions about what a nation will do or would have done are generated by calculating the rational thing to do in a certain situation, given specified objectives.

(...)

Although the Rational Actor Model has proved useful for many purposes, there is powerful evidence that it must be supplemented, if not supplanted, by frames of reference that focus on the governmental machine – the organizations and political actors involved in the policy process. Model I's implication that important events have important causes, i. e., that monoliths perform large actions for large reasons, must be balanced by the appreciation that (1) monoliths are black boxes covering various gears and levers in a highly differentiated decision-making structure and (2) large acts result from innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives. Model I's grasp of national purposes and of the pressures created by problems in *inter*-national relations must confront the *intra*-national mechanisms from which governmental actions emerge.

Recent developments in organization theory provide the foundation for the second model, which emphasizes the processes and procedures of the large organizations that

constitute a government. According to this Organizational Process Model, what Model I analysts characterize as “acts” and “choices” are thought of instead as *outputs* of large organizations functioning according to regular patterns of behavior. Faced with the problem of Soviet missiles in Cuba, a Model II analyst frames the puzzle: From what organizational context and pressures did this decision emerge? He then fixes the unit of analysis: organizational output. Next, he focuses attention on certain concepts: the strength, standard operating procedures, and repertoires of organizations. And finally, he invokes certain patterns of inference: if organizations produced an output of this kind today, that behavior resulted from existing organizational features, procedures, and repertoires. A Model II analyst has “explained” the event when he has identified the relevant Soviet organizations and displayed the patterns of organizational behavior from which the action emerged. Predictions identify trends that reflect established organizations and their fixed procedures and programs.

The third model focuses on the politics of a government. Events in foreign affairs are understood, according to this model, neither as choices nor as outputs. Rather, what happens is characterized as a *resultant* of various bargaining games among players in the national government. In confronting the problem posed by Soviet missiles in Cuba, a Model III analyst frames the puzzle: Which results of what kinds of bargaining among which players yielded the critical decisions and actions? He then fixes the unit of analysis: political resultant. Next, he focuses attention on certain concepts: the perceptions, motivations, positions, power, and maneuvers of the players. And finally, he invokes certain patterns of inference: if a government performed an action, that action was the resultant of bargaining among players in games. A Model III analyst has “explained” this event when he has discovered who did what to whom that yielded the action in question. Predictions are generated by identifying the game in which an issue will arise, the relevant players, and their relative power and skill.

(...)